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Abstract--The high penetration of Renewable Energy Sources in 
modern smart grids necessitated the development of Demand 
Response (DR) mechanisms as well as corresponding innovative 
services for the emerging flexibility markets. From a game-
theoretic perspective, the basic key performance indicators 
(KPIs) for such DR mechanisms are: efficiency in terms of social 
welfare, practical applicability, and incentive guarantees, in the 
sense of making it a dominant strategy for each user to act 
truthfully according to his/her preferences, leaving no room for 
cheating. In this paper, we propose a DR architecture, including 
a mechanism based on Ausubel’s clinching auction and a 
communication protocol, that provably guarantee both efficiency 
and truthful user participation. Practicality/easiness of 
participation is enhanced via simple queries, while user privacy 
issues are addressed via a distributed implementation. 
Simulation results confirm the desired properties, while also 
showing that the truthfulness property becomes even more 
important in markets where participants are not particularly 
flexible. 
 
Index Terms—Demand Response, Auction, Smart Grid, 
mechanism design, truthfulness 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Serving the energy demand in peak demand times might be 
quite expensive for the grid operator, because of the need to 
constantly maintain costly energy reserves. Also, in regions 
with high penetration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES), 
adjusting the demand to meet the intermittent generation can 
enhance the efficiency and economic viability of the system. 
As a result, the idea of offering monetary incentives (rewards) 
to consumers in order to decrease their consumption at peak 
demand times is getting a great deal of attention both from the 
research community and the Industry. Such techniques are 
generally referred to as Demand Response (DR). More 
specifically, when there is a need for reducing energy 
consumption in real-time, an ad-hoc market is created where 
the operator offers to buy consumption reduction from the 
users. Users participate in such a DR event by offering their 
consumption flexibility in exchange for monetary 
compensation. 
In the modern smart grid, each user (consumer) has a smart 
meter that measures his/her consumption at all times. The grid 
operator can assess the aggregated consumption of users at a 
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particular part of the grid in real-time. Users are interested in 
their own payoff, which results from the reward they receive 
and the discomfort they experience from reducing their energy 
consumption. On the other hand, the operator is interested in 
the reduction of the aggregated consumption at peak times. 
Assuming strategic user behavior, the above setting turns into 
a game, since each user’s payoff is dependent on the actions of 
other users. In more detail, discomfort could be modeled 
through a local function, so that it is expressed in monetary 
terms. However, users are usually not capable of capturing 
their preferences in a closed form mathematical function and 
even if they were, they are reluctant to reveal their 
preferences. Rather, it is more natural for the users to simply 
take actions (e.g. turn appliances on/off, or adjust power 
consumption) in response to price signals.  
An intermediate entity is assumed to resolve the formulated 
game and clear the ad-hoc flexibility market described above. 
We refer to this entity as the Flexibility Service Provider 
(FSP). The FSP is assumed to be an independent entity with 
the objective of coordinating the flexibility trading in the most 
efficient way. Formally, in economics, the “most efficient 
way” is characterized by the concept of maximizing the social 
welfare, defined as the aggregated payoff of all market 
participants. However, the users’ local functions (related to 
their flexibility/comfort levels and consumption habits) are 
private to each user. This makes the task of the FSP quite 
challenging, especially when we consider users who act 
strategically and might misrepresent their local function if that 
makes them better-off. 
In this paper, we propose a DR architecture through which 
FSPs will be able to optimally resolve the aforementioned 
game. In particular, we draw on concepts of mechanism 
design theory in order to define an iterative, auction-based 
mechanism, consisting of an allocation rule and a payment 
rule. The allocation rule refers to the way that the FSP decides 
upon how much consumption reduction will be allocated to 
each user according to the feedback obtained through the 
auction process. The payment rule refers to the way the FSP 
decides upon the reward of each user for his/her allocation, 
provided that the user makes the corresponding contribution. 
Through the auction procedure, the FSP exchanges messages 
with the users in the form of queries. A query in our case is a 
price signal communicated from the FSP to the user, to which 
the latter responds with his/her preferred action (i.e. 
consumption reduction) according to this signal. Note that a 
user may respond untruthfully if he/she finds that to be in 
his/her interest.  
A mechanism is generally evaluated by: i) its performance 
in terms of social welfare, i.e. efficiency, ii) the tractability of 
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the outcome, and iii) its incentive guarantees. The first two are 
commonly addressed in the literature and point to the 
allocation’s efficiency and the mechanism’s convergence time 
and consequent scalability. In contrast, the third requirement 
(that points to truthful participation) is widely overlooked in 
the DR literature. In the few cases where truthfulness is 
addressed, it comes with a sacrifice of practical 
implementation ability and user privacy. In the rest of this 
section we analyze what the third requirement is about and 
how it is handled in the state-of-the-art DR studies. 
User strategies in games such as the one described above 
are subject to thorough study and discussion. Mechanism 
design theory classifies a mechanism’s incentive guarantees 
with respect to how users are expected to act when 
participating in it. The strongest guarantee is called Dominant 
Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC). We say that a 
mechanism is DSIC when it is at each user’s best interest to 
truthfully implement his/her true preferences at any query, 
regardless of what other users do. 
Surprisingly, the vast majority of studies in the DR 
literature do not provide any guarantees as we will analyze 
shortly. This drawback is typically rationalized by assuming 
that an individual user’s load is very small compared to the 
whole system’s aggregated load and thus the user can be 
approximated as a price taker (his/her actions, taken alone, 
have no effect on the system’s dynamics). Under this 
assumption, each user implements his/her most favorable 
action (consumption decision), assuming the actions of other 
users to be constant. This process is repeated until an 
equilibrium is reached. The users are typically modeled to 
iteratively implement their best-response every time they are 
asked a query, i.e., they decide upon their preferred 
consumption upon receiving a price signal. This strategy 
updating procedure is called best-response dynamics. As 
analyzed in [1], such myopic “local rationality” does not 
necessarily imply “global rationality”, i.e., given an iterative 
mechanism, it is not always to the user’s best interest to 
repeatedly best-respond. Rather, a user might be better-off by 
submitting false bids through the process. 
Best-response dynamics converges to an efficient allocation 
under the price-taking assumption described above. 
Nevertheless there are several use cases in which the 
assumption of price-taking behavior is rather strong and 
unjustified. For example, a large industrial consumer’s actions 
may have a significant effect on the system. Also, when it 
comes to DR-events, the users called to participate are often 
required to be in a particular geographic location where 
congestion problems arise, in which case the relevant user 
population is not large. Another example includes islanded 
micro grids formed at neighborhood level, especially ones 
with high RES penetration. In such use cases, the number of 
users in the formulated game is drastically reduced. This 
means that a single user’s actions may no longer be 
insignificant and a mechanism implemented in best-response 
strategies fails to capture user incentives. As a result, users are 
better expected to behave strategically, and strategic behavior 
may compromise the mechanism’s efficiency [2]. In this paper 
we also address the third requirement, defined as the 
capability of the mechanism to provoke strategic users to act 
truthfully in accordance with their preferences, which is 
overlooked in most of the DR literature. Moreover, we do so 
via an indirect and practical mechanism, which allows for 
distributed and privacy-preserving implementation, in contrast 
to the few studies that consider incentive guarantees that do 
not exhibit these characteristics.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we present a literature review of DR studies from the 
perspective of incentive guarantees. In Section 3, we present 
the model assumed. In Section 4, we present the problem 
formulation. In Section 5, we present and analyze the 
proposed auction mechanism and prove that it has the desired 
properties. In Section 6, we demonstrate the performance and 
verify the properties of the proposed system. Finally, in 
Section 7 we describe a privacy-preserving communication 
protocol that can implement the proposed mechanism. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
In the DR architectures/frameworks that have appeared in the 
literature, the end user is typically modeled as a selfish player 
who participates in the mechanism with the purpose of 
maximizing his/her own payoff. The user’s preferences are 
widely modeled as a convex function (e.g. [3]-[5]) in 
accordance with microeconomic theory [6]. However, studies 
differ on the way they model the behavior and the strategy of 
the users participating in the game. More specifically, there 
are three levels of behavior modeling, in increasing order of 
user rationality:  
A) “naive”, de-facto truthful users, assumed to always 
truthfully report their preferences 
B) locally rational users, assumed to apply a myopic best-
response process (maximizing their payoff at each iteration of 
the mechanism as if it were the last iteration) 
C) strategic, globally rational users, who are aware of the 
mechanism’s structure and apply a strategy that maximizes 
their final payoff (possibly by submitting false responses). 
Several studies either assume naive users of category A 
([7]-[15]) or assume no user preferences and perform central 
optimization for the scheduling problem (e.g. [16]-[17]). 
The majority of DR works assume “price-taking users” 
which translates to category B, i.e., locally rational users. 
Static-pricing approaches (e.g. [18]-[19]), as well as typical 
dual decomposition approaches (including [3]-[5] and [20]-
[25]), assume users of category B. Under the price-taking 
assumption, the solution concept is that of a competitive 
equilibrium. A market-clearing pricing approach brings the 
system to competitive equilibrium via an iterative best-
response process, and the final allocation maximizes the social 
welfare. However, as described above, in many use cases 
(such as emerging local energy communities [26], [27] 
islanded micro-grids, etc) the price-taking assumption no 
longer holds and the efficiency of these mechanisms is 
compromised [2]. In mechanism design terms, the 
mechanisms of the first two categories are not incentive 
compatible, because a strategic user can benefit by 
manipulating his/her responses. 
Few works consider user incentives. When considering 
strategic users (of category C), the mechanism designer is 
confronted with a trade-off: the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
(VCG) mechanism is the unique welfare maximizing 
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mechanism implemented in dominant (and not best-response) 
strategies, meaning that either a VCG-based approach is taken 
[26]-[27] or welfare maximization is compromised [30]-[34].  
The main problem with the VCG approaches [26]-[27] is 
that they require users to reveal their whole set of preferences 
to the FSP, while the latter makes all the calculations and 
decides the allocation and the rewards. This is clearly 
impractical, since real users generally can’t express their 
preferences in closed-form mathematical functions and even 
when they can, they are not happy to compromise their 
privacy by sharing their whole set of preferences with the FSP. 
In this paper, we opt for a VCG-like approach, so as to 
achieve social welfare maximization, but we omit the direct-
revelation approach of the typical VCG mechanism. Instead, 
we design an iterative auction mechanism based on Ausubel’s 
clinching auction, in which users are only required to make 
decisions regarding their consumption in the presence of price 
signals. By adopting this approach, we implement the efficient 
VCG outcome but also allow for a distributed implementation 
and a privacy-preserving communication protocol.  
Summarizing the above, our proposed DR architecture: i) is 
suitable for a distributed implementation (unlike [26]-[27]), ii) 
achieves the VCG outcome and does not sacrifice efficiency 
(unlike [30]-[31]), and iii) is incentive compatible (unlike 
studies that assume users of categories A and B). 
III.  SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider a flexibility market comprised of an FSP and a 
set             of   self-interested consumers, hereinafter 
referred to as users. We also consider a discrete representation 
of time, where continuous time is divided into timeslots     
of equal duration  , where set             represents the 
scheduling horizon. Each user possesses a number of 
controllable appliances, with each appliance bearing an energy 
demand. Since demands of different appliances are assumed 
independent and are not coupled, we can consider one 
appliance per user for ease of presentation and without loss of 
generality. We denote by the set of appliances. 
User & appliance modeling 
An appliance requires an amount of energy for operation. For 
example, if an appliance’s operating power is 1Watt, and 
        , then the energy that the appliance consumes in 
one timeslot of operation is    . This energy consumption is 
measurable in real-time and can be shed if the user wishes. In 
particular, we consider controllable loads, meaning that the 
user can modify consumption upon request, in exchange for 
monetary compensation. Such a request for consumption 
modification is called a DR-event. Upon a DR-event asking 
for reduction of the real-time consumption in timeslot  , user   
can respond by reducing his/her consumption by a quantity   
 , 
assumed to be positive (  
    , without loss of generality. 
Also,   
  is characterized by its feasible set    (defined by a 
set of constraints on   
 ) and the discomfort function      
   of 
user  . The discomfort function is private to each user and 
expresses the minimum compensation in monetary units ($) 
that a user requires, in order to reduce his/her consumption by 
the corresponding amount. The discomfort as a function of   
  
can take various forms, depending on the appliance. We make 
the following assumptions on the form of function      
  : 
Assumption 1. Zero consumption reduction, brings zero 
discomfort to the user: 
        
Assumption 2. The discomfort function is non-decreasing in 
  
 :  
   
     
          
         
   
Assumption 2 says that consuming more does not make the 
user less comfortable. 
Assumption 3: The discomfort function is upward sloping, 
meaning that additional increase of   
  brings increasing 
discomfort to the user: 
   
     
          
            
    
       
         
         
     
      
In order to incentivize users to reduce their consumption, 
the FSP offers a reward      
  . A user’s utility is defined as 
the difference between his/her discomfort for the consumption 
reduction realized and the reward he/she received for this 
reduction is 
   ∑ [     
        
  ]    .     (1) 
In order to offer the rewards      
  , the FSP draws on the 
reward offered by the operator who requests the reduction as 
described in the following subsection. 
DR-event and the FSP 
Let    denote the aggregated consumption of all users in  , as 
seen by the operator, within a certain time interval  . Upon a 
DR-event, the operator (e.g. the DSO that operates the smart 
grid) asks for a reduction of the users’ aggregated 
consumption during a certain time interval and offers 
monetary incentives to the FSP towards its realization. Let    
denote the reduction in the aggregated consumption at  . The 
incentive (reward) is implemented as a per-unit compensation 
for the electricity units of reduced consumption. The cost of 
serving the aggregated energy consumption is typically 
modeled with quadratic functions [3]-[5] and [20]-[25] as 
explained in [35]. In this paper, we adopt the same approach 
and in direct analogy we assume that the compensation that is 
offered to the FSP by the operator, can be modeled as a 
concave function of   . For the purpose of being specific, we 
adopt here a polynomial function        of a specific form  
                         [    ]   (2) 
where     are positive parameters with       . The 
proposed DR architecture is open to any other choice of 
      , provided it is a concave function. Thus, we assume 
that upon a DR-event, the operator offers a marginal per-unit 
reward  
  
 (  (  ))
     
          (3) 
for a consumption reduction of    units. 
The FSP is responsible for aggregating the users’ 
participation in the DR-event, coordinating their actions, and 
dividing the compensation profits (rewards) among the users. 
We assume a communication network, built on top of the 
electricity grid, through which the FSP can monitor each 
 4 
user’s consumption and exchange messages with the users.  
IV.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
With respect to the system described above, we would like to 
facilitate the allocation of consumption reduction among the 
users so as to maximize social welfare. Social welfare is 
defined as the difference between the revenues        that the 
FSP receives from the operator for the consumption 
curtailment    and the sum of the discomfort that this 
curtailment causes to its users. This problem can be 
formulated from Eqs. (4) and (4a) below: 
     
        
        ∑ [     
  ]         (4) 
        ∑   
 
            (4a) 
The problem defined by Eqs. (4) and (4a) is a convex 
optimization problem and could be solved efficiently if the 
local functions      
   were known (or truthfully disclosed). 
However,      
   of each user is not known and thus, problem 
(4) is typically solved via dual decomposition in the DR 
literature (see [3]-[5] and [20]-[25]). This approach, however, 
is not incentive compatible as we will analyze shortly. In 
particular, the final allocation of the dual decomposition 
approach is identical to that obtained through the ascending 
English auction (see algorithm 2 of [3]), which halts when 
supply equals demand. More specifically, in the system model 
described and in case of an English auction, the FSP would 
iteratively increase a per-unit reward   asking the users their 
consumption reduction   
     at each per-unit reward   
(auction query). At each iteration, each user i responds with 
his/her preferred   
    . A truthful (locally optimal) response 
by user  , denoted as    ̃   , is one that maximizes  ’s utility 
for reward  . This is mathematically formulated as the 
solution to maximization problem (5): 
    ̃            
        
     
       
       (5)  
Clearly,    ̃    is non-decreasing in    since   
      The 
auction terminates when   reaches a value for which 
∑   
         
    . The final price is commonly called the 
market-clearing price and it is denoted here as    . The 
allocation at     is efficient if the users truthfully report their 
  
  at each FSP query. However, truthful report may not be the 
best strategy for every user. To illustrate this, we present the 
following example: 
Illustrative example 
Consider two users and a given timeslot t. User 1 operates a 
load with power consumption 10 kW while user 2 operates a 
50 kW load. Now suppose they participate in a DR event and 
their discomfort function is      
         
   ,        ,  
where their true flexibility parameters are           . 
The reward function is                 . Should they act 
according to their true discomfort function parameters, their 
utilities (given from Eq. (1)) at equilibrium would be    
         units. In case User 2 acts untruthfully according 
to   
        , his utility at equilibrium will be     . 
Therefore, the best strategy of User 2 is to be untruthful.    
The previous example demonstrates how the market-
clearing approach builds on the assumption that users behave 
myopically, by truthfully maximizing their utility at each 
iteration. However, a DR-event will involve smart players 
(e.g. industrial consumers, aggregators) and it will not take 
long before users realize that they can benefit from 
engineering untruthful responses. The problem is that if we 
relax the truthfulness assumption and consider strategic users, 
market-clearing methods (e.g., the English auction presented 
above) no longer result in efficient allocations. For this reason 
it is very important to design a mechanism that is not only 
efficient but also incentive compatible. 
In order to facilitate the description of the proposed 
mechanism, we first present the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
(VCG) mechanism, which is the unique mechanism that 
makes it a dominant strategy (DSIC as analyzed in the 
introduction) for each user, to act truthfully, i.e. in accordance 
with his/her real discomfort function [36]. Let    , denote the 
set of users, excluding user  . The VCG payment rule is the so 
called “Clarke pivot rule”, which calculates a reward    equal 
to  ’s “externality”. In other words, it rewards each user   with 
an amount equal to the difference that  ’s presence makes in 
the social welfare of other users       : 
     
     (∑   
 
     )   ∑   (  
 )       
         (∑    ̂     )  ∑   (  
 ̂)             (6) 
where   
  denotes the vector allocated to user   when problem 
(4) is solved with user   included in the system, and    ̂ denotes 
the vector allocated to user   when the same problem is solved 
without user  ’s participation.  
In the direct VCG mechanism, users are asked to declare 
their local functions      
   to the FSP. Because of the Clarke 
pivot rule, it is a dominant strategy for each user to make a 
truthful declaration [36]. Thus, the efficient allocation that 
corresponds to the social welfare maximization problem can 
be calculated at the FSP side. In order to calculate the VCG 
rewards from Eq. (6), problem (4) is solved | |    times 
(one time with each user in   absent to calculate the 
payments, plus one time with all users present to calculate the 
allocation). The major drawback of the direct VCG 
mechanism is the requirement that the users disclose their 
discomfort functions      
   to the FSP. This raises important 
issues such as a) Lack of privacy in case where users are 
reluctant to reveal local information (their discomfort 
function) and b) Difficulty in implementation in cases where 
users are unable to express their preferences (i.e., their 
discomfort function) in a closed form function.  
In the next section, we propose a modification of Ausubel’s 
Clinching auction [37], which allows for a distributed 
implementation of VCG as described in section VII, designed 
to tackle these issues.  In particular, we opt for an iterative 
auction that:  
i) facilitates user bids via auction queries, thus making the 
proposed architecture more easily implementable in practice 
ii) engages users in the market and allocates consumption 
reduction gradually along the way, so that price discovery is 
facilitated on the users’ side 
iii) protects user’s privacy via a properly designed 
communication protocol. 
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V.  AUSUBEL’S CLINCHING AUCTION FOR DR-EVENT 
PARTICIPATION 
The Clinching Auction (CA) is a well-known ascending 
price auction (similar in fashion to English Auction) that halts 
when demand equals supply. However, in contrast to most 
auctions (including the English auction), allocation and 
rewards are not cleared exclusively at the final iteration. 
Rather, the goods (consumption reduction in our context) are 
progressively allocated as the auction proceeds and payments 
are also progressively built, while the auction design 
guarantees that the final allocation and payments coincide 
with the ones obtained through VCG. Thus, both allocation 
efficiency and incentive compatibility are achieved, while the 
aforementioned privacy and implementation drawbacks of the 
direct-VCG mechanism are effectively addressed. 
In order for the CA to work in our setting, we need to 
reverse the price trajectory. In the proposed Modified 
Clinching Auction (MCA), the FSP begins with a per-unit 
reward        which gradually decreases at each iteration. 
By Eq. (3), reward      is 
      
    
  , which, as analyzed in 
Section 3, is the highest value possible given that    is 
concave. Users respond by bidding their preferred 
consumption reduction    ̃    for each  . We represent the 
user’s response at   as the solution to the user utility 
maximization problem (which is formally defined in Eq. (5) of 
the previous section). 
The user’s objective function is concave in   
 , since     
  
is linearly increasing and      
   is convex by Assumption 3. 
Also, the solution    ̃ is increasing in  , which means that the 
user’s response    ̃ gradually decreases as   decreases. Note 
that in the extreme and trivial case where 
     ∑ (   ̃      )     
      the users would shut down 
everything and proportionally share the reward       .  
In MCA, the initial price is      and in each iteration   the 
price    is reduced by a small positive number  . The size of   
adjusts the discretization level of MCA. For the decreasing 
reward auction that we propose, we relax constraint (4b) to the 
inequality  
   ∑   
 
    .         (7) 
Consider an arbitrary iteration   of the MCA and let        
denote the operator’s desired reduction for per-unit reward   . 
The central idea of the MCA is the following: if there is a set 
     for which we have  
       ∑ (   ̃  
  )           (8)  
then we allocate a reduction equal to   
         
∑ (   ̃  
  )     to each user    
  at a per-unit reward   . 
We then say that user   “clinched”   
  units. The MCA auction 
terminates when set    that satisfies condition (8) and set  , 
are equal, that is, constraint (7) is satisfied. After that, it 
allocates the remaining          proportionally to the users 
that bid in the second-to-last iteration. 
The critical advantage of the Clinching auction is that it 
allocates different amounts of units at different rewards, 
and the units that a user clinches do not depend on his/her 
own bid but only on the other users’ bids. The algorithm 
that implements MCA is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The MCA algorithm 
1. Initialize        ,   
       ,  
             
2. while         ∑ (   ̃  
  )    
3. if there exists   : ∑ (   ̃  
  )      
      
4.             clinch units    
         ∑ (   ̃  
  )     
for all      at per-unit reward    
5.        else  
6.             set           and       
7.             ask each user a reduction query for    and                
                 collect the responses   
      
8.             ask the operator for the desired total  
                reduction        at per-unit-reward    
9. End while 
10. Clinch units 
  
  (  
        ∑   
    
   )  
  (    )
∑   
          
   
 at per-unit reward       , for each     
We are now in a position to prove the optimality of 
MCA in terms of social welfare performance: 
Theorem 1: The social welfare loss at the final allocation 
of MCA is within                of the maximum 
possible. 
Proof:  The value of   at which    ∑ (   ̃)    is defined as 
   , which gives 
        ∑ (   ̃     )   .     (9) 
Let   denote the number of iterations until the auction halts, 
that is, 
  ⌈
        
 
⌉          (10) 
where ⌈ ⌉, denotes the rounding to the nearest integer above. 
We have 
⌈
        
 
⌉      ⌈
        
 
⌉     (11) 
After the last clinchings (line 10 of the algorithm) we have 
efficiently allocated   (    ) reduction units to the users. 
The remaining          
 (    ) are not allocated and this 
causes the loss of welfare (     ) that is depicted as the grey 
area in Fig.1, where the red line represents       and the blue 
line represents ∑    ̃      .  
 
Fig. 1      and ∑ (   ̃  
  )    as a function of   
Since we remain agnostic of the closed form of ∑ (   ̃  
  )   , 
we assume the worst case and calculate an upper bound on the 
sum of the grey plus the yellow area of Fig 1: 
         ( 
        
 (    ))  
 
 
      
    ( 
        
 (    ))   
By substituting       
   
  
 from Eq. (3), we get 
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   ( 
       )
  
 
    (        )
  
  
 
(    )
 
      
 
  
 . 
By further substituting                  and also 
substituting   from inequalities (11), using the left inequality 
when   appears with a minus sign and the right inequality 
when it appears with a plus sign, we finally obtain 
      
         
  
 , 
completing the proof.                  
In practice, for the relevant use cases of price-anticipating 
users (described in the introduction), the computational 
complexity of the MCA is small, which allows for a very 
small choice of  . To emphasize this, it is useful to state the 
following corollary to Theorem 1: 
Corollary 1: for     the welfare loss grows linearly with  . 
Because the MCA includes a price-sensitive response also 
at the operator’s side, we have to verify that the properties of 
efficiency and incentive compatibility still hold. This is proved 
in the following Propositions. 
Proposition 1: Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy in 
MCA. 
Proof: Fix an iteration   and suppose that   bids 
        
         ̃  
   in that iteration. From step 4 of MCA, 
we see that   
  does not depend on   
  but only on the other 
users’ bids   
     . Thus, user  ’s bid can affect  ’s allocation 
only by changing the   at which the termination condition 
holds. This means that a false bid         
      will make a 
difference to  , only if   is the last iteration. However, by 
definition of    ̃  
   (see Eq. (5)), any bid         
      
   ̃  
    brings strictly lower utility to user   at any iteration  . 
Thus, truthful bidding brings the highest utility to user  .        
Furthermore, the following properties of the VCG 
mechanism hold also for the MCA: 
Proposition 2: MCA is individually rational, weakly 
budget-balanced, and achieves the maximum revenue for 
the FSP among all efficient mechanisms. 
Proof: The MCA auction is welfare maximizing (by Theorem 
1, for   small enough) and DSIC (by Proposition 1). However, 
the class of VCG mechanisms is the unique class that 
simultaneously achieves these two properties [38]. Thus, 
MCA terminates with the VCG allocation and payments, and 
it inherits the property of individual rationality. For the weak 
budget balance property, it suffices to show that our setting 
exhibits the no single-agent effect [38]. An environment 
exhibits no single-agent effect if the aggregated utility of 
    users doesn’t improve by adding a  th user to the 
system. This property holds in single-sided auctions with 
monotonous preferences [38], since dropping a user only 
reduces the competition for the remaining users, thus making 
them better-off. 
 Moreover by [36], the VCG mechanism maximizes the 
auctioneer’s utility, which means that the FSP buys flexibility 
units from the users at the lowest possible price (among all 
efficient and individually rational mechanisms).       
VI.  PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION 
In this section, we use simulations to demonstrate the 
advantages of the MCA and verify its properties. As a 
benchmark for comparison, we use the typical market-clearing 
pricing where all users receive a per-unit reward of    . Over 
a time horizon of 24 timeslots, we simulated two DR events, 
in timeslots 11 and 17 where there was a peak in the 
aggregated consumption. Parameters   and   of the reward 
function were set to     and        for both timeslots.  
We used a simple model for the user’s discomfort function: 
     
     
     
     
where parameter   
  expresses the user’s inelasticity in 
timeslot  . In order to obtain results for a wide range of 
parameters   
 , we pick   
  from a random uniform 
distribution in [      ,       ] for      and in [       , 
      ] for     , where parameter    will vary in our 
experiments. We set the step        in the MCA algorithm 
(Table 1). Figure 2 depicts the aggregated consumption along 
all 24 timeslots for     , which shows the reductions in 
consumption corresponding to the DR events. 
 
Fig 2. Aggregated consumption as a function of time with and without DR events 
in timeslots 11 and 17 
In order to verify the truthfulness property and that a user 
can only lose by not being truthful, we assume that one user 
acts untruthfully by manipulating his/her    for timeslot 17, 
while all other users act truthfully. The untruthful user is 
indexed by    (for cheater). The cheater’s utility     is 
maximized for a certain choice of    , denoted as    
      
. 
Figure 3 shows     as a function of     (for     ). 
 
Fig 3. Focal user's utility as a function of his/her choice of   
The black vertical line represents the focal user’s actual 
(real)  , denoted as      . For the MCA, the user’s optimal 
choice of   coincides with his/her real  , that is    
       
     , thus verifying Proposition 1. 
Next, we investigated the effect that cheating has on the 
FSP’s profits, denoted by           for the case where users 
act truthfully and by        for the case where they act 
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according to what brings them the highest utility. Figure 4 
shows that the ratio                  is maximized and is 
equal to 1 for the MCA, verifying our theoretical results. We 
also observe that the FSP’s profit loss due to untruthfulness 
rises with    (i.e. when users are less elastic), indicating that 
our scheme’s truthfulness property becomes more important in 
markets where participants are not particularly flexible. 
 
Fig 4. Ratio 
      
         
 as a function of    
Finally, we simulated the DR-event for timeslot 17 for 
different values of  , measuring the proportional welfare loss 
      
         
    
, 
where      is the optimal welfare and      is the welfare 
achieved by the MCA. The simulation results in Fig. 5 verify 
Corollary 1, which states that for small values of   the upper 
bound on the welfare loss grows linearly with  . 
 
Fig 5. Proportional welfare loss of MCA as a function of the price step    
VII.  PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION 
A major drawback of the direct VCG mechanism is that it 
requires each user to know and disclose his/her discomfort 
function to a central entity, e.g., the FSP. The MCA auction 
implements the VCG allocation and payments via an indirect 
mechanism. In this way users are only required to respond to 
FSP queries, instead of being required to communicate their 
discomfort function. This allows a distributed implementation 
of an efficient and truthful DR architecture. In what follows 
we present a distributed communication protocol that 
preserves privacy while simultaneously ensuring an efficient 
allocation. 
The proposed DR architecture exploits [39] in order to 
execute MCA in a distributed fashion. In this way, the FSP 
does not have to learn the answers to the queries, which are 
instead acquired only by users in   in a distributed fashion. 
Thus, the proposed DR architecture acts as a substrate that 
offers a service over which participating users cooperate in 
order to protect their personal data (i.e. their discomfort 
functions      ) from the FSP. In order to achieve this, [39] 
uses the scheme proposed by Kademlia [40] in which each 
node (i.e., end user/energy consumer) is identified by a 
number (nodeID) in a specific virtual space. The nodeIDs do 
not serve only as identification, but they are also used by the 
Kademlia algorithm to store and locate values/data hashes 
(i.e., the answers to the FSP queries). This process is realized 
through a peer to peer routing service (implemented in the 
network application layer) that Kademlia offers. Towards this 
end, participating nodes create and dynamically maintain 
routing tables in a bottom up organized way. In fact, the 
nodeID provides a direct map to these data hashes by storing 
information on where to obtain them. The proposed algorithm 
is executed in three steps: 
1. Data insertion: At each iteration   of the algorithm, each 
user (node)   stores its bid    ̃     in another random node   
through the use of the aforementioned [40] system. It is 
highlighted that   is different for each   and   (as it is derived 
from the output of the hash function that Kademlia uses), and 
in this way collusion of two users (which is a requirement that 
[41] sets), or even collusion of a relatively small number of 
users to acquire data, will fail. 
2. Calculation of   
     : Kademlia organizes the 
participating nodes in a tree like structure. The proposed 
system exploits this structure in order to calculate the sum 
∑    ̃  
     . To do so in a distributed way, node   waits until 
all nodes with lower nodeID from it, inform   on possible data 
values they have to send to  . This process continues 
recursively until the node with the highest id acquires the 
desirable data and then it calculates the sum. At this point, this 
node also receives        from the FSP and checks the 
termination condition. If it doesn’t hold, the node proceeds by 
broadcasting ∑    ̃  
      and  
      to all nodes through the 
use of Kademlia tree [40]. Thus, each node   calculates   
      
by subtracting the    ̃  
   value that is stored in it (which is 
not its own    ̃  
   value, and it doesn’t know whose it is). 
3. Final allocation and payments calculation: at the next 
iteration    , a different instance of Kademlia tree is 
created, so that   
          is stored at a new node  , other 
than  . Thus, even in the case that a node is malicious, data 
privacy is not compromised. The tuple      ∑   
          
∑ [  
        ]     , which contains the allocation and 
payments of user   up until iteration  , is passed from user   to 
 . At the final iteration, the tuples    are communicated to the 
FSP. Note that the FSP receives only the final allocation and 
payments for each user, i.e., only the sum of   
      and not 
all the intermediate values   
     . This means that the FSP 
(and any other node for that matter) does not have the data to 
construct the entire local discomfort function       of user  . 
Note that the analysis above assumes that the service 
provider is honest-but-curious. By this we mean that the FSP 
is curious to know the discomfort functions of end users, but is 
also honest and will never attack the system in order to acquire 
them. In case of malicious FSP (i.e. with no hesitations to 
break the law), more strict privacy assumptions are needed, 
but this case is outside the scope of the present work. 
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